Monday, January 17, 2011

The Seven Sins of Fund Management

“This collection of notes aims to explore some of the more obvious behavioral weaknesses inherent in the ‘average’ investment process. Seven sins (common mistakes) were identified:

1. The first was placing forecasting at the very heart of the investment process. An enormous amount of evidence suggests that investors are generally hopeless at forecasting. So using forecasts as an integral part of the investment process is like tying one hand behind your back before you start.

2. Secondly, investors seem to be obsessed with information. Instead of focusing on a few important factors (such as valuations and earnings quality), many investors spend countless hours trying to become experts about almost everything. The evidence suggests that in general more information just makes us increasingly over-confident rather than better at making decisions.

3. Thirdly, the insistence of spending hours meeting company managements strikes us as bizarre from a psychological standpoint. We aren’t good at looking for information that will prove us to be wrong. So most of the time, these meetings are likely to be mutual love-ins. Our ability to spot deception is also very poor, so we won’t even spot who is lying.

4. Fourthly, many investors spend their time trying to ‘beat the gun’ as Keynes put it. Effectively, everyone thinks they can get in at the bottom and out at the top. However, this seems to be remarkably hubristic.

5. Fifthly, many investors seem to end up trying to perform on very short time horizons and overtrade as a consequence. The average holding period for a stock on the NYSE is 11 months [in 2005, nowadays is less, according to the same author]! This has nothing to do with investment; it is speculation, pure and simple.

6. Penultimately, we all appear to be hardwired to accept stories. However, stories can be very misleading. Investors would be better served by looking at the facts, rather than getting sucked into a great (but often hollow) tale.

7. And finally, many of the decisions taken by investors are the result of group interaction. Unfortunately groups are far more a behavioral panacea. In general, they amplify rather than alleviate the problems of decision making.

Each of these sins seems to be a largely self imposed handicap when it comes to trying to outperform. Identifying the psychological flaws in the ‘average’ investment process is an important first step in trying to design a superior version that might just be more robust to behavioral biases.”



Source:

James Montier – Seven Sins of Fund Management

Sunday, January 16, 2011

Why we love predictions

"Behavioral scientists have discovered that at the core of the dislike human beings have for randomness, is an overwhelming desire to believe we are in control. "Knowing" that the S&P 500 will close at 1,450 next year gives investors that feeling of control, even though it gets us into the stock market after it has doubled."

Below you have some healthy advice about the "The Folly of Forecasting":

"Whenever you find yourself reading (or watching) someone who tells you where a stock or the markets are going, consider these factors:

- No one truly knows what tomorrow will bring. Nobody. Any and all forecasts are, at best, educated guesses.

- All prognostications are instantly stale, subject to further revision. Conditions change, new data are released, events unfold. Yesterday's prediction can be undone by tomorrow's press release.

- In order to "become right," some investors will stand by their predictions despite a stock or the market going the opposite way, hoping to be proven correct. Ned Davis called this the curse of "being right rather than making money."


Sources:

Allan Roth - 5 Financial Predictions for 2011

Barry Ritholtz - The Folly of Forecasting

Monday, January 03, 2011

Arthur Huprich's List of Investment Rules

P. Arthur Huprich published a terrific list of rules at year’s end. Other than commandment #1, they are in no particular order:

• Commandment #1: “Thou Shall Not Trade Against the Trend.”

• Portfolios heavy with underperforming stocks rarely outperform the stock market!

• There is nothing new on Wall Street. There can’t be because speculation is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market today has happened before and will happen again, mostly due to human nature.

• Sell when you can, not when you have to.

• Bulls make money, bears make money, and “pigs” get slaughtered.

• We can’t control the stock market. The very best we can do is to try to understand what the stock market is trying to tell us.

• Understanding mass psychology is just as important as understanding fundamentals and economics.

• Learn to take losses quickly, don’t expect to be right all the time, and learn from your mistakes.

• Don’t think you can consistently buy at the bottom or sell at the top. This can rarely be consistently done.

• When trading, remain objective. Don’t have a preconceived idea or prejudice. Said another way, “the great names in Trading all have the same trait: An ability to shift on a dime when the shifting time comes.”

• Any dead fish can go with the flow. Yet, it takes a strong fish to swim against the flow. In other words, what seems “hard” at the time is usually, over time, right.

• Even the best looking chart can fall apart for no apparent reason. Thus, never fall in love with a position but instead remain vigilant in managing risk and expectations. Use volume as a confirming guidepost.

• When trading, if a stock doesn’t perform as expected within a short time period, either close it out or tighten your stop-loss point.

• As long as a stock is acting right and the market is “in-gear,” don’t be in a hurry to take a profit on the whole positions. Scale out instead.

• Never let a profitable trade turn into a loss, and never let an initial trading position turn into a long-term one because it is at a loss.

• Don’t buy a stock simply because it has had a big decline from its high and is now a “better value;” wait for the market to recognize “value” first.

• Don’t average trading losses, meaning don’t put “good” money after “bad.” Adding to a losing position will lead to ruin. Ask the Nobel Laureates of Long-Term Capital Management.

• Human emotion is a big enemy of the average investor and trader. Be patient and unemotional. There are periods where traders don’t need to trade.

• Wishful thinking can be detrimental to your financial wealth.

• Don’t make investment or trading decisions based on tips. Tips are something you leave for good service.

• Where there is smoke, there is fire, or there is never just one cockroach: In other words, bad news is usually not a one-time event, more usually follows.

• Realize that a loss in the stock market is part of the investment process. The key is not letting it turn into a big one as this could devastate a portfolio.

• Said another way, “It’s not the ones that you sell that keep going up that matter. It’s the one that you don’t sell that keeps going down that does.”

• Your odds of success improve when you buy stocks when the technical pattern confirms the fundamental opinion.

• As many participants have come to realize from 1999 to 2010, during which the S&P 500 has made no upside progress, you can lose money even in the “best companies” if your timing is wrong. Yet, if the technical pattern dictates, you can make money on a short-term basis even in stocks that have a “mixed” fundamental opinion.

• To the best of your ability, try to keep your priorities in line. Don’t let the “greed factor” that Wall Street can generate outweigh other just as important areas of your life. Balance the physical, mental, spiritual, relational, and financial needs of life.

• Technical analysis is a windsock, not a crystal ball. It is a skill that improves with experience and study. Always be a student, there is always someone smarter than you!


Source: Art Huprich’s Market Truisms and Axioms

Monday, November 29, 2010

On Conventional Wisdom

“… it is the long-term investor … who will in practice come in for most criticism wherever investment funds are managed by committees or boards or banks. For it is the essence of his behavior that he should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion. If he is successful, that will only confirm the general belief in his rashness; and if in the short run he is unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not receive much mercy. Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”

Source: John Maynard Keynes via Investment Postcards

Saturday, November 13, 2010

Behavioral Investment Tips

Top tips for better decision making

This applies to me, you and everyone else.

You know less than you think you do.

Be less certain in your views, aim for timid forecast and bold choices.

Don’t get hung up on one technique tool, approach or view – flexibility and pragmatism are the order of the day.

Listen to those who don’t agree with you.

Top tips for better decisions

You didn’t know it all along, you just think you did. Forget relative valuation, forget market prices, work out what the stock is worth (use reverse DCFs).

Don’t take information at face value, think carefully about how it was presented to you.

Don’t confuse good firms with good investments, or good earnings growth with good returns.

Vivid, easy to recall events are less likely than you think they are, subtle causes are underestimated.

Try to focus on facts, not stories.

Sell your losers and ride your winners.

Beating the biases

Being aware of the biases is not enough. It is just an important first step.

Need to create a framework that incorporates mental best practice. Easier said than done. Mental bad habits are persistent.

The good news, we continue to create new brain cells throughout our lives.

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Market Wizard Quote of the Day

“Michael Marcus taught me one other thing that is absolutely critical: You have to be willing to make mistakes regularly; there is nothing wrong with it. Michael taught me about making your best judgment, being wrong, making your next best judgment, being wrong, making your third best judgment, and then doubling your money.

Whenever I enter a position, I have a predetermined stop. That is the only way I can sleep. I know where I'm getting out before I get in. The position size on a trade is determined by the stop, and the stop is determined on a technical basis. I never think about other people who may be using the same stop, because the market shouldn't go there if I am right.

Place your stops at a point that, if reached, will reasonably indicate that the trade is wrong, not at a point determined primarily by the maximum dollar amount you are willing to lose.

If you personalize losses, you can't trade.”


Bruce Kovner

Sunday, November 07, 2010

Market Wizard Quote of the Day

"Taking advantage of potential major winning trades is not only important to the mental health of the trader but is also critical to winning. Letting winners ride is every bit as important as cutting losses short. If you don't stay with your winners, you are not going to be able to pay for the losers.

In addition to not overtrading, it is important to commit to an exit point on every trade. Protective stops are very important because they force this commitment on the trader."

Michael Marcus

Wednesday, November 03, 2010

The Night of the living Fed

Today is the important FED announcement day when "Big Ben" is expected to give details of the QE2. Jeremy Grantham, the chief investment strategist of Boston-based GMO has just published the October edition of his quarterly newsletter entitled “Night of the living Fed”. In this report, Grantham’s outlines what he believes to be the disastrous effects that the policies of the Fed, under the direction of both Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, have had on the U.S. and global economies.

Bellow we have Prieur du Plessis summary of Grantham’s attack:

1) Long-term data suggests that higher debt levels are not correlated with higher GDP growth rates.

2) Therefore, lowering rates to encourage more debt is useless at the second derivative level.

3) Lower rates, however, certainly do encourage speculation in markets and produce higher-priced and therefore less rewarding investments, which tilt markets toward the speculative end. Sustained higher prices mislead consumers and budgets alike.

4) Our new Presidential Cycle data also shows no measurable economic benefits in Year 3, yet point to a striking market and speculative stock effect. This effect goes back to FDR, and is felt all around the world.

5) It seems certain that the Fed is aware that low rates and moral hazard encourage higher asset prices and increased speculation, and that higher asset prices have a beneficial short-term impact on the economy, mainly through the wealth effect. It is also probable that the Fed knows that the other direct effects of monetary policy on the economy are negligible.

6) It seems certain that the Fed uses this type of stimulus to help the recovery from even mild recessions, which might be healthier in the long-term for the economy to accept.

7) The Fed, both now and under Greenspan, expressed no concern with the later stages of investment bubbles. This sets up a much-increased probability of bubbles forming and breaking, always dangerous events. Even as much of the rest of the world expresses concern with asset bubbles, Bernanke expresses none. (Yellen to the rescue?)

8) The economic stimulus of higher asset prices, mild in the case of stocks and intense in the case of houses, is in any case all given back with interest as bubbles break and even overcorrect, causing intense financial and economic pain.

9) Persistently over-stimulated asset prices seduce states, municipalities, endowments, and pension funds into assuming unrealistic return assumptions, which can and have caused financial crises as asset prices revert back to replacement cost or below.

10) Artificially high asset prices also encourage misallocation of resources, as epitomized in the dotcom and fiber optic cable booms of 1999, and the overbuilding of houses from 2005 through 2007.

11) Housing is much more dangerous to mess with than stocks, as houses are more broadly owned, more easily borrowed against, and seen as a more stable asset. Consequently, the wealth effect is greater.

12) More importantly, house prices, unlike equities, have a direct effect on the economy by stimulating overbuilding. By 2007, overbuilding employed about 1 million additional, mostly lightly skilled, people, not counting the associated stimulus from housing-related purchases.

13) This increment of employment probably masked a structural increase in unemployment between 2002 and 2007, which was likely caused by global trade developments. With the housing bust, construction fell below normal and revealed this large increment in structural unemployment. Since these particular jobs may not come back, even in 10 years, this problem may call for retraining or special incentives.

14) Housing busts also help to partly freeze the movement of labor; people are reluctant to move if they have negative house equity. The lesson here is: Do not mess with housing!

15) Lower rates always transfer wealth from retirees (debt owners) to corporations (debt for expansion, theoretically) and the financial industry. This time, there are more retirees and the pain is greater, and corporations are notably avoiding capital spending and, therefore, the benefits are reduced. It is likely that there is no net benefit to artificially low rates.

16) Quantitative easing is likely to turn out to be an even more desperate maneuver than the typical low rate policy. Importantly, by increasing inflation fears, this easing has sent the dollar down and commodity prices up.

17) Weakening the dollar and being seen as certain to do that increases the chances of currency friction, which could spiral out of control.

18) In almost every respect, adhering to a policy of low rates, employing quantitative easing, deliberately stimulating asset prices, ignoring the consequences of bubbles breaking, and displaying a complete refusal to learn from experience has left Fed policy as a large net negative to the production of a healthy, stable economy with strong employment.


Friday, October 29, 2010

Disconnect: Wall Street - Main Street in US



Interesting to notice the recent break in the correlation between the Consumer Confidence and the S&P500 in US. The two indicators should go together in normal times..and at some point they will probably recorrelate..either by rising consumer confidence or by a fall in the S&P500.

Source: The Big Picture